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Abstract 
 
Empirical literature that examines the determinants of inflation in Iran has suggested inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon. This study investigates the effect of political instability and governance parameters 
on inflation in Iran over 1959 to 2010. This research sought to identify the profound factors which 
determine inflation in Iran. Using a combination of the predictions of Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) 
determination and Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy (PEMP) literature and applying the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), we study this relationship through two different models. The 
results of monetary model indicate that the effects of monetary determinants depend on the political 
environment of Iran. The political model expresses a positive relationship between inflation and political 
instability and governance parameters.  
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Introduction 
The negative effects of unbridled inflation are not covered for economists. Higher inflation creates inefficiencies 
that reduce social welfare. Abounoori et al. (2013) showed there is a threshold effect between inflation rate and economic 
growth in Iran. Abounoori et al. (2013) state when the inflation rate is larger than 20.59%, the economic growth 
decreases. In the empirical literature that examines the determinants of inflation in Iran, far too little attention has been 
paid to the governance and political instability as a possible factor. Following Friedman’s famous dictum that “inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” more than half of these studies have suggested inflation as a monetary 
phenomenon. In fact the majority of economists admit that the main reasons lie behind the inflation, are the monetary and 
fiscal policies. Although this interpretation leads to a deeper and more fundamental question of why economic policy 
makers, despite the general consensus on the negative effects of inflation, adopt specific monetary and fiscal policies 
leading to inflation? (Aisen and Veiga 2006a) (Aisen and Veiga 2006b) 
In the last half-century, Iran has faced substantial changes resulting from the Islamic Revolution, the experience 
of eight-year war with Iraq, early dismissal of governments, the assassination of executives, frequent changes in 
government, the military coups and the formation of democratic institutions. Such political instability damages the 
implementation and continuation of policies and it also blemishes the governor’s reputation. This instability would hinder 
the formation, implementation and effectiveness of policies such as attempts in bridling the inflation (Khan and Saqib 
2011). The inflation is shaded Iran’s economy since 1971 and continues to be considered in macroeconomic decisions 
and plans as a big issue to deal with yet. 
 
Objectives: 
Our study is about to finding out the roots of inflation over the period 1959 to 2010 based on the relative 
importance of monetary and nonmonetary or political factors in Iran. We are going to understand how last half-century 
changes in the society of Iran such as revolution, war, frequent changes in government and etc. have affected inflation as 
a macroeconomic parameter. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
 The first time Sargent & Wallace (1981) showed that monetary policy cannot control inflation in the short term 
and long term without major changes in fiscal policy. In other words, they argued the issue of fiscal policy domination in 
which fiscal authority finance deficits by bond sales and seignorage and the monetary authority is not able to influence 
inflation. 
 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999, 2000) examined two versions of the fiscal theory of price level (FT), weak-form FT 
and strong-form FT. Weak-form FT postulates that inflation is indeed a monetary phenomenon, although that money is 
dictated by the fiscal authority. Strong-form FT, on the other hand, argues that even if money growth is fixed, fiscal 
policy independently affects the price level and inflation rate. Thus the strong-form FT posits that fiscal policy influences 
inflation dependent on the changes in government debt or budget deficit and independent of changes in money growth. 
Khan and Saqib (2011) for illustrating this point assumed fiscal budget balance equation as D ൅ S൫m୥൯ ൌ B଴ P଴⁄  which D 
is the present value of the future budget surplus, S൫m୥൯ is the seignorage and m୥ is the money growth. They suppose P଴ is 
the nominal price level and B଴ is the value of government debt. According to this framework, by a constant money 
growth ሺm୥ ൌ 1ሻ the above equation would become P଴ ൌ B଴ D⁄ . This indicates that for any future increase in budget 
surplus, prices shall fall and for any future decrease in budget surplus (increase in deficit) prices must rise to restore 
balance in the fiscal budget. Similarly increase in the value of government debt would also increase price level and vice 
versa. 
 Edwards and Tabellini (1991) in their empirical study find evidence which government change and polarization 
as the measures of political instability result in inflation in developing countries. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) present a 
model that indicates political instability and polarization influence the social choice function and hence budget deficits 
and debt. If a government believes it is unlikely to be elected again, excess expenditures could be financed with debt 
issuance since it does not internalize the associated costs of debt repayment and also confines the expenditures of 
opponent party who win the next election. Progressively this process leads to higher budget deficits and debt. They 
anticipate countries with more unstable political situation and more polarized circumstance would face higher budget 
deficits and thus, according to FTPL, more inflation rate. To study this prediction Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 
(1989) showed higher degrees of political instability results in more inflation rates. 
 Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue another channel of deficit persistence which is called ‘war of attrition’ between 
different socioeconomic groups with conflicting distributional objectives. By applying the literature on dynamic games 
between a monetary and fiscal authority with conflicting objectives they found that even if termination of a deficit is 
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efficient; each group attempt to wait the others out and it does not come to a political agreement until certain groups 
relegate their political opponents to partly tolerate the burden of fiscal adjustment. Finally stabilization would be 
extremely expensive for any group. Stabilization only occurs when a disproportionate share of the burden inevitably will 
be accepted and borne by one party. Thus more political parties in a parliament make it harder to reach an agreement and 
lead to a higher budget deficit and inflation rate.  
 Aisen and Veiga (2006a) argue in a country with frequent government changes, macroeconomic policies will 
also change consistently because the new economic executives want to pursue their own ideas which are different from 
their predecessors. Macroeconomic policy changes will threaten inflation. Moreover cabinet changes and government 
crisis will shorten the horizon of policy makers. Thus the importance of short term objectives will increase and keeping 
inflation in rational range would be difficult.  
 Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1989) and Aisen and Veiga (2006a) discuss that developing countries have 
an inefficient tax collecting system which propel government to print money for financing public expenditures. This 
reliance on seignorage results in inflation. 
 Paldam (1987) investigates the relationship between inflation and political instability in eight Latin American 
countries over 1946-83. He argues this relation is bi-directional and works in two paths. The main path is conveyed to 
inflation costs and responsibility hypothesis that states people recognize the government responsible for economic 
outcomes. One of the potent results of popularity functions literature is that higher inflation rate is accompanied by lower 
popularity and less partnership in election. Therefore when inflation rises, the popularity causes the current government to 
remain in power reduces. The path from politics to inflation is related to public expenditures which weak governments 
finance by inflation tax. Subsequently when inflation increases they cannot resist against political pressures and would 
alternate executives and plans.  
 Drazen (2000) argues interest groups ask other groups to undertake the burden of disinflation costs. Necessarily 
to fragmented communities with diverse groups of beneficiaries and weak political institutions are incapable in changing 
the status in the face of difficult economic conditions and their inflation rate is higher and more persistent. 
 Bonato (2008) studies Iran’s decreasing inflation rate over 2002 to 2006 in spite of continuous fast growth of 
money and doubts the structural stability between money and inflation in Iran. By applying M1 in the model he finds out 
a strong relationship between money and inflation and also no evidence of a structural change in their relationship. 
Actually he could predict this decline in inflation by the lagged impact of the past deceleration in M1 growth. 
 
Results: 
 Alesina and Tabellini (1992) point out that the problem of joint endogeinity between economic and political 
variables should be resolved. Political instability could lead to economic difficulties; however, the weak economic 
situation increases the likelihood of government collapses. In Aisen and Veiga (2006a) study for investigating the effect 
of political instability on inflation, political instability variables which are affected by inflation were considered 
endogenous because there is a bi-directional relationship. They know the importance of their research in accounting for 
inflation inertia and for endogeneity of important economic and political variables affecting inflation. As mentioned in 
literature, Paldam (1987) has also points out the bilateral relationship between politics and inflation. 
 Also in this research there is a bi-directional relationship between explanatory and dependent variables which 
means inflation affects governance and political instability variables too. On the other hand we insert one period of 
lagged inflation as inflation inertia to the model thus conventional estimators such as OLS would present inconsistent 
estimates. Therefore we apply GMM method which is introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and more explanations 
are provided in Silva and Santos (2011). 
 Our empirical study to finding out the roots of inflation in Iran over the period 1959 to 2010 is based on the 
relative importance of monetary and nonmonetary factors in explaining inflation in Iran. After estimating a common 
monetary model according to the literature which considers inflation as a pure monetary phenomenon, we apply the 
political instability variables to identify their influences. 
 
Monetary Model: 
 Following the literature the monetary model has the below form: 
π୲ ൌ α଴π୲ିଵ ൅ β୧M୲ ൅ ε୲          (1) 
  
π୲ is the inflation rate and π୲ିଵ is one period lagged inflation rate as a representative of inflation inertia. M୲ is a vector of 
monetary variables such as money supply, credit allocated to the private sector, exchange rate and fiscal balance. β୧s are 
the parameters and ε୲ is the error term. 
 Estimation of equation (1) by OLS method results inconsistent estimates because of simultaneity. Thus we apply 
GMM method using political instability as instruments. According to Khan and Saqib (2011), if the estimation results are 
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significant then it obviously implies that without political instability the mentioned monetary model does not explain 
inflation in Iran sufficiently and also enables us to study nonmonetary determinants of inflation. 
According to the equation (1), the specified model is as below: 
ܫܰܨ ൌ ܥሺ1ሻ כ ܫܰܨሺെ1ሻ ൅ ܥሺ2ሻ כ ܯ2 ൅ ܥሺ3ሻ כ ܥܴܧܦܫܶ ൅ ܥሺ4ሻ כ ܨܫܵܥܣܮ ൅ ܥሺ5ሻ כ ܧܺܥܪ           (2) 
   
The variables and sources of information are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table  1: Variables of Monetary Model. 
Source Description Variable 
World Bank (2013) Dependent variable is Inflation as the yearly growth rate of Consumer 
Price Index 
INF 
World Bank (2013) One period of lagged inflation as inflation inertia INF(-1) 
World Bank(2013) Annual rate of money supply or liquidity as a percentage of GDP 
(Money and quasi money as a percentage of GDP) 
M2 
World Bank(2013) Domestic credit to private sector as a percent of GDP CREDIT 
Central Bank of 
Iran (2013) 
Budget deficit as a percent of GDP FISCAL 
Central Bank of 
Iran (2013) 
Exchange rate in the informal market EXCH 
C(1), C(2), C(3), C(4) and C(5) are the coefficients. 
 
Estimation result of monetary model is as follow: 
 
Table 2: Monetary model estimation. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INF(-1) 0.468 0.024 19.636 0.000 
M2 0.272 0.014 19.045 0.000 
CREDIT -0.008 0.029 -0.269 0.789 
FISCAL 0.300 0.066 4.527 0.000 
EXCH -0.000 0.000 -3.481 0.002 
R-squared 0.386 J-statistic 8.827 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.594 Prob(J-statistic) 0.996 
Source: findings of research 
 The variable Credit allocated to private sector is not significant since the probability of type one error in 
rejecting H0 is very high (=0.789). This result seems rational when we look into the structure of Iran’s economy because 
the governmental companies cover whole economy and the private sector is very small. After neglecting CREDIT, below 
results are obtained: 
 
Table 3: Second monetary model estimation (without CREDIT). 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INF(-1) 0.394 0.012 33.544 0.000 
M2 0.320 0.007 42.766 0.000 
FISCAL 0.535 0.059 8.953 0.000 
EXCH -0.0002 0.000 -4.446 0.001 
R-squared 0.353 J-statistic 8.347 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.763 Prob(J-statistic) 0.998 
Source: findings of research 
 
 Considering the amount of Prob(J-statistic) which is greater than 0.05, estimation is not located at the criteria 
area of ࣑2 distribution, therefore the authenticity of moments are approved and the GMM method is appropriate. As 
expected all monetary determinants of inflation model are positive and significant except exchange rate that is highly 
close to zero (0.0002). 
 As mentioned before, significance of the monetary model indicates that without political instability (as strong 
instruments of the monetary model), this model does not explain inflation in Iran sufficiently and also enables us to study 
nonmonetary determinants of inflation. 
5 | P a g e  
 
 
Nonmonetary (Political) Model: 
 According to the strong-form FTPL, the capacity and effectiveness of government in managing the economy are 
more important factors in determining inflation. Thus we consider the following model for studying this perspective of 
inflation: 
 
π௧ ൌ α଴ ൅ βଵW୲ ൅ βଶPI୲ ൅ ε୲         (3) 
 
W୲ is a vector of nonmonetary determinants of inflation, PI୲ is a vector of political instability variables and ε୲ is the error 
term. 
 Referring to the literature and based on the studies of Aisen and Veiga (2006a) and Khan and Saqib (2011), the 
nonmonetary model is specified as following: 
 
ܫܰܨ ൌ ܥሺ1ሻ כ ܫܰܨሺെ1ሻ ൅ ܥሺ2ሻ כ ܥܣܤሺെ1ሻ ൅ ܥሺ3ሻ כ ܩܱܸ ൅ ܥሺ4ሻ כ ܱܲܮܫܻܶ ൅ ܥሺ5ሻ כ ܮܱܩሺܧܺܥܪሻ ൅ ܥሺ6ሻ
כ ܮܱܩሺܩܦܲሻ ൅ ܥሺ7ሻ כ ܮܱܩሺܱܫܮሻ ൅ ܥሺ8ሻ כ ܮܱܩሺܣܩܴሻ ൅ ܥሺ9ሻ כ ܮܱܩሺܴܶܣܦܧሻ         ሺ4ሻ 
 
 
 Following Aisen and Veiga (2006a) we are not going to consider money supply and budget deficits in our 
nonmonetary model since we are looking for deep determinants of inflation. We intent to answer this question precisely: 
which parameters affect monetary and fiscal policies and hence inflation? 
We hypothesize that inflation is explained by three different types of variables: 
1. Political instability in Iran is scaled by three different variables which to the appropriate extent reflect the 
political environment of the public: 
• Cabinet changes, CAB(-1), is the most important variable in measuring political instability. It represents the 
number of times in a year a chief executive and/or 50% of cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. Serious 
changes in government composition can be the consequences of an election, a government crisis, a coup d’etat 
and etc. Cabinet changes variable is lagged one period since if a cabinet change happens in the end of a year, it 
leads to higher seignorage and inflation in the next year (Aisen and Veiga 2008). Moreover, in Iran the old 
fashioned bureaucratic system reduces the affecting speed of any alternatives thus such an approach to the style 
of cabinet changes’ effect on inflation would be rational. 
• Government crisis, GOV, accounts for the number of situations in a given year that menace and threaten to 
undermine a current regime. Greater Cabinet changes and Government crisis implies increase in political 
instability, thus positive coefficients are expected. 
• Polity IV dataset, POLITY, represents political regime characteristics and transitions. It is the output of Polity IV 
project coding democratic and autocratic “patterns of authority” and regime changes. Polity ranges from -10 
(absolutely Autocratic) to +10 (absolutely Democratic), that means increase in Polity then signifies a more 
democratic polity and decrease for a more autocratic one. 
2. Variables which reflect a government’s capacity to control inflation: 
• Logarithm of Agriculture value added as a percent of GDP, LOG(AGR). 
• Trade share, LOG(TRADE), is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. 
• Logarithm of Exchange rate, LOG(EXCH). 
3. A set of variables accounting for government performance and exogenous shocks: 
• Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency, GDP. 
• Logarithm of Oil Price, LOG(OILP), Dollars per Barrel. 
 
 We use annual time series data for the years 1959–2010 that potently covers the economic and political 
environment of Iran. Cabinet changes, CAB(-1), and Government crisis, GOV, are obtained from Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive. Polity IV dataset, POLITY, comes from Center for Global Policy, George Mason University. GDP 
per capita growth, LOG(GDP); Trade share, LOG(TRADE) and Agriculture value added, LOG(AGR) are from World 
Bank. Oil Price, LOG(OILP), is gained from Dow Jones & Company; Exchange rate in the informal market, 
LOG(EXCH), is from Central Bank of Iran. The source of Inflation is presented in Table 1. 
 According to mentioned references for GMM method, instruments are the levels of variables lagged two or more 
periods. 
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Table 4: Nonmonetary model estimation. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INF(-1) 0.371932 0.000332 1118.595 0.0000 
CAB(-1) 2.470013 0.003923 629.6652 0.0000 
GOV -3.777085 0.000765 -4936.068 0.0000 
POLITY -1.433207 0.000930 -1540.885 0.0000 
LOG(EXCH) 5.613199 0.003471 1617.399 0.0000 
GDP -0.644474 0.000245 -2628.633 0.0000 
LOG(OILP) -6.724100 0.005565 -1208.300 0.0000 
LOG(AGR) -2.983707 0.004145 -719.8499 0.0000 
LOG(TRADE) -1.964120 0.002800 -701.5715 0.0000 
R-squared 0.342608 J-statistic 9.479449 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.586007 Prob(J-statistic) 0.999582 
Source: findings of research 
 
 Considering the amount of Prob(J-statistic)=0.99 which is greater than 0.05, estimation is not located at the 
criteria area of ࣑2 distribution, therefore the authenticity of moments are approved and the GMM method is appropriate. 
All coefficients are significant and have an effect on inflation. 
 Lagged inflation by a coefficient of 0.37 indicates that 37% of inflation is explained by inflation inertia which is 
relatively equal to the coefficient of this variable in monetary model (0.39) and this fact implies political instability and 
monetary policies have the same explanatory power in determining inflation. According to Table 4, the results for three 
types of variables are as following: 
 Lagged Cabinet changes, CAB(-1), has a positive and significant effect on inflation in parallel with literature. 
Government changes oblige policy makers to heighten short term objectives in pursuing their own ideas and consequent 
macroeconomic policies lead in higher inflation rates. Research shows that a unit increase in Cabinet changes would raise 
the inflation rate with the coefficient of 2.47. this result is consistent with those of Aisen and Veiga (2006a), Khan and 
Saqib (2011), Paldam (1987), Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Alesina and Tabellini (1992). 
 The most intriguing and controversial result is the effect of Government changes, GOV, on inflation rate of Iran. 
In contrary to what was thought the coefficient of this variable is -3.7 and has a negative and significant effect on 
inflation. This result is inconsistent with those of Aisen and Veiga (2006a) and Khan and Saqib (2011). In this case we 
can point out the following items: 
1. In Econometrics perspective most of major Government crisis were accompanied by Cabinet changes and since 
the lagged one period of the latter is imported to the model, the time series analysis indicates if the inflation rate 
raises simultaneously by the increase of the Cabinet changes and the Government crisis, the pure inflation 
upward fluctuation is due to the effect of previous cabinet changes. 
2. Government crisis in Iran has often driven the economy into a recession and with high degrees of Polity index 
and to some extent the possibility of increasing the price controls and subsidies, the combined effect of these two 
variables could be negative. 
3. Iranian society during crises has always been on the scene until can return the situation to normal. 
4. Religious movement in the country, due to its deep penetration in various social ranks, has exhorted people to 
support the government and the subsequent synergy kept prices low. 
 Although these four points can clarify some aspects of the issue, for better interpreting further studies should be 
performed. 
 For Polity the viewpoint of Aisen and Veiga (2006a), Haggard and Kaufman (1992), and Paldam (1987) which 
acknowledge that developing countries with high levels of Polity index may have a better ability to control inflation, is 
not corroborated in Iran, because this variable with the coefficient of -1.43 has a negative and significant effect on 
inflation rate and indicates in long term the mandatory price controls do not occur. It is consistent with the conventional 
understanding that a democratic form of government ensures economic freedom and a systematic way of governance. 
Thus more the Iran moves towards a more democratic form of government, the more inflation decreases. 
 LOG(AGR), LOG(TRADE) and LOG(EXCH) as representatives of the government capacity in bridling inflation 
have the coefficients of -2.98, -1.96 and 5.61 respectively. Obviously with the support and investment in agriculture and 
then increase in production and supply the inflation rate will decrease that is consistent with the findings of Khan and 
Saqib (2011). Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1989) argue difficulty of the agricultural sector taxing may increase 
reliance on seigniorage and consequently inflation. However this research is not approving this perspective. 
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 In relation to Trade share it should be noted that the openness and the increasing volume of trade with the world 
reduces inflation. Thus the conventional knowledge that the rise of world trade leads to lower prices, will be confirmed. 
In this regard study of Khan and Saqib (2011) shows trade share with the coefficient of 20.7% has a positive and 
significant effect on inflation rate of Pakistan. Aisen and Veiga (2006a) state countries with a larger foreign trade sector 
are more exposed to external shocks that may increase inflation and expect a positive sign for openness. On the other 
hand Edwards and Tabellini (1991) indicate that greater openness to trade may favor the adoption of trade- related taxes 
in developing countries reducing the need of other distortionary forms of taxation such as the inflation tax. According to 
their view, greater openness to trade should be associated with lower inflation. Possibly, one could argue that the sign of 
the coefficient of trade openness is the net effect of two opposing channels affecting inflation namely, external exposure 
to shocks and tax substitutability. Apparently in Iran; with very large, heavy and strict laws and customs tariffs and duties 
and governmental intrusion and subsequent rental associated with corruption proceedings; the latter attitude is happening 
and the net effect of increase in trade share is to reduce inflation rate. Moreover Trade share is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product, considering the fact that one of the greatest 
resources of Iranian government income is revenues from the sale of oil, thus increase in Trade share variable can be 
caused by the bilateral influence of the global rising oil prices. Trade share goes up from rising oil prices because of both 
the increase in export value due to the rising oil prices as the main part of the Iran's export basket, and the increase in 
imports, the supply of goods due to growing foreign exchange revenues and hence controlling prices. Government 
reliance on seignorage will also reduce by increase in revenues. With regard to the recent point and view of Edwards and 
Tabellini (1991), the total effect of trade share on inflation is negative; that is, the more Trade share increases more 
capacity of government in controlling inflation rises and more inflation reduces. This upward capacity of government 
could be both caused by increasing efficiency and competitiveness in economy and rising oil prices. 
 Comparison between monetary and nonmonetary indicates that mechanism of Exchange rate effect on inflation 
is through Money supply, M2, and Lagged inflation, INF(-1), since the coefficient of Exchange rate in the informal 
market, EXCH, in monetary model is approximately equal to zero; however, in nonmonetary model has the coefficient of 
5.61. This positive and significant effect of Exchange rate is consistent with those of Davoodi (1997), Nazifi 1997) and 
Masoudi and Tashkini (2005). The study of Kia (2006) shows the exchange rate policy has been a major effective 
variable on inflation over the long run in Iran. He considers exchange rate as a monetary instrument which its increase 
leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency and hence increase in the price level. Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) also 
concludes inflation is not merely a monetary phenomenon and it is to some extent a result of the depreciation of the 
Iranian Rial in the black market and partly of imported inflation. 
 Variables accounting for government performance and exogenous shocks; annual percentage growth rate of 
GDP per capita, GDP, and logarithm of Oil Price, LOG(OILP), have the coefficients of -0.64 and -6.72 respectively. 
Government performance improvement, equivalent to the per capita GDP growth, would reduce inflation. This finding is 
consistent with those of Aisen and Veiga (2006a), Khan and Saqib (2011), Tabibian and Soori (1996), Masoudi and 
Tashkini (2005), Emadzade, Samadi, and Hafezi (2005), Dehmordeh and Kasai (2011), and Hosseini nasab and 
Rezagholizade (2009). 
 However the Oil price affecting mechanism is more wrapped and sophisticated since various government 
policies could drive inflation in different directions. This research indicates Oil price as a proxy for exogenous shocks on 
Iran’s oil-based economy, has a negative and significant effect on inflation which contradicts the results of Hosseini 
nasab and Rezagholizade (2009) about inflation rate of Iran and also Khan and Saqib (2011) about inflation in Pakistan as 
an oil-poor country. These two Pakistani economists estimated the coefficient of oil price variable 2.4%. It should be 
noticed that Oil price is correlated with both growth rate of GDP per capita and Trade share because; firstly, a large 
proportion of the country's GDP is derived from oil revenues and hence rising oil prices would improve government 
performance; secondly, rising oil prices would raise government’s foreign exchange revenues and enables government to 
manage inflation rate by adapting importation. 
 
Discussion: 
 In this section we intend to peruse the study of Bonato (2008) who argues Iran’s declining inflation rate over 
2002 to 2006 in spite of continuous fast growth of money and doubts the structural stability between money and inflation 
in Iran. By applying M1 in the model he finds out a strong relationship between money and inflation and also no evidence 
of a structural change in their relationship. Indeed he could predict this decline in inflation by the lagged impact of the 
past deceleration in M1 growth. 
 Here we are not going to violate Bonato’s opinion or present more evidence. What he stated is definitely 
approved and the lagged impact of the past deceleration in M1 growth decreased inflation rate over 2002 to 2006. 
However as discussed in the literature our fundamental aim is to extract deep determinants of inflation rate in Iran. Thus 
this research basic question is that why did past M1 growth decelerate? Referring to political instability parameters, we 
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apprehend that Polity has a relative great condition over 1997-2003. Polity from the value (-6) in 1996 reached to (+3) in 
1997 and remained the same until 2003 and this increase in the number of Polity implies the more democratic governance 
during these years. Therefore, it is argued that a disciplined government with less political instability decelerated M1 
growth over 1997 to 2003 and this decline led to a decrease in inflation rate over 2002 to 2006 despite continuous fast 
growth of money. The purpose of this mention was to present a practical approach for the hidden thought behind this 
study. Although most policy makers know the consequences of excess money creation, just some of them can implement 
right policy in practice. Actually governments should organize a disciplined structure with low political instability 
distortions. 
 
Conclusion: 
 Understanding the fact that fiscal and monetary policies are the main determinants of inflation through FTPL, 
along with the way political issues affect government’s budget deficits and debt through PEMP; in this research we 
attempted to extract deep determinants of inflation in Iran. We investigated the question that why those particular 
monetary and fiscal policies were applied which opened up inflation context in Iran’s economy and they still continue. 
This is how Game Rules would change by the parameters such as governance and political instability which could not 
even be comprehensively observable in our dynamic model; however, the prevailing direction of the economy and social 
circumstances that this model offers should be observed with a quite look of contemplation and pondering. 
 In this study, in order to provide an appropriate analysis of inflation, two models of monetary and non-monetary 
determinants have been estimated. The monetary model demonstrated without political instability, is not able to provide 
an adequate explanation of inflation in Iran. Furthermore this result enables us to study nonmonetary determinants of 
inflation. Non-monetary (political) model emphasized the significant effect of political and governance variables such as 
Polity, Cabinet changes, and Government crisis on inflation. More Cabinet changes increase inflation since by incessant 
government changes, macroeconomic policies will also be altered consistently. These changes in stabilization policies 
accompanied by heightening short term objectives due to higher likelihood of being replaced before the term 
consequently will result in great inflation rates. 
 The result for the variable Polity refutes this perspective that developing countries with high levels of Polity 
index may have a better ability to control inflation. The negative effect of Polity on inflation rate indicates in long term 
the mandatory price controls do not occur in Iran and it is consistent with the conventional understanding that a 
democratic form of government ensures economic freedom and a systematic way of governance. Thus more the Iran 
moves towards a more democratic form of government, the more inflation decreases. From a social-economic aspect to 
this issue, it can be noted to the fact that democracy is a form of teamwork with a range of whole community. When all 
members of a team know themselves the owner of team’s achievements, they obviously spend greater efforts and the 
results presumably tend to be relatively more worthy. If individuals of a society acknowledge themselves effective to 
their own destiny and have an active presence in the elections and other social events, incentives rise and better economic 
outcomes will be achieved. 
 The most interesting result of this study is the effect of Government changes on inflation rate of Iran. Contrary to 
what is assumed, government changes will decrease inflation. Although for better interpreting further studies should be 
carried out, in the framework of this paper we presented an econometric, an economical and two social explanations. 
Econometric explanation states most of major Government crisis in Iran were accompanied by Cabinet changes, thus if 
the inflation rate raises simultaneously by the increase of the Cabinet changes and the Government crisis, the pure 
inflation upward fluctuation is due to the effect of previous cabinet changes. Indeed the shortened horizon of the members 
of government will raise reliance on seignorage due to frequent cabinet changes not government changes. In economical 
view Government crisis in Iran has often driven the economy into a recession and with high degrees of Polity index and 
to some extent the possibility of increasing the price controls and subsidies, the combined effect of these two variables 
could be negative. One of the social explanations is extracted from Iranian pursuit of freedom and democracy; Iranian 
society during crises has always been on the scene until can return the situation to normal. Another social explanation is 
induced by religious movement in the country. Religious movement due to its deep penetration in various social ranks has 
exhorted people to support the approved government and the subsequent synergy kept prices low. 
 Increased level of Agricultural output, development in Openness and rising Trade share would reduce inflation 
rate. Exchange rate with the increase in liquidity and inflation expectations has an impact on inflation thus managed 
floating exchange rate policy and maintaining the exchange rate within a reasonable range and avoiding sharp 
fluctuations by creating buffers against fluctuations in oil prices such as foreign currency reserves account and national 
development fund which are beyond the reach of government, can prevent inflation. 
 Improving government performance (equivalent to increase in per capita GDP growth), will decline inflation. 
Oil price as a representative of shocks has a negative effect on inflation of Iran’s economy that is considered as an oil-
based economy. 
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